

# TERRITORIAL SHOCK

## The Moral Impact of Boundary Change in Two Millennia

*Gertjan Dijkink*

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### APPENDIX (pp. 225-227)

The argument in brief

#### Chapter 1 Territorial Shock: an introduction

Territorial shocks reflect a conflict between an established territorial practice (order) and political changes which demand a new moral confirmation. A territorial order is defined by the implementation of three dimensions: *closure* (who and what is subordinated to an authority), *governance* (resources developed by the authority) and *identity* (the meaning of the territorial order). Globalization is a contemporary source of territorial shock. This book distinguishes between two previous shifts in the evolution of the Western (European) territorial state that aroused reactions fitting the idea of territorial shock: the transformation from an imperial system to a collection of sovereign states at the end of the Middle Ages and the rise of the infrastructural nation-state since the early 19<sup>th</sup> century.

#### Chapter 2 Barbarians at the gates: the classic Empires

*Closure*: the classic empire did not recognize legitimate equals, only various tribes (or kingdoms) that had to be pacified or deterred. Consequently, the Empire's armies regularly crossed the border zone.

*Governance*: this consisted of numerous intermediaries that were supposed to implement top-down control. Integration depended on bureaucratic discipline (imperial education and awarding of honours), but corruption was difficult to detect.

*Identity*: the empire as direct extension of heaven. Classified as *passive* because there was no role for other identities (like ethnic distinctions as justification for territorial autonomy).

#### Chapter 3 A New Jerusalem: the birth of the territorial state

The dissolution of the imperial ideal in the centuries after 1300 made *closure* a hot issue (How to delimit the new kingdoms, particularly if they had liberated themselves? What to do with dispersed territories of a royal dynasty? etc.). Moreover the passive conception of the emperor (or pope) as representative of God became an active *identity* question about the legitimacy of territorial sovereigns. This territorial shock was partly resolved by the Reformation and in other cases by a holy conception of the state or its special guidance by God. *Governance* in the hands of the state was dominated by taxation, but many practical tasks continued to be in the hands of local caretakers, nobility or dignitaries. Governance is therefore characterized as *passive*.

#### Chapter 4 The vertigo of public space (High-Modern territoriality)

The arrival of the 19<sup>th</sup> century saw the rise of a central state that was bent on making the territory productive by infrastructural control and collecting information (*governance* active). General education in a national language emphasized the mutual dependency of people that before had

been completely indifferent to each other. Participating in the same enterprise with 'others' was a source of territorial shock, but was alleviated by the moral imperative of sharing national 'genes' (*identity* active). The idea of a fixed state system (substantiated by a surge in the number of multilateral treaties) made *closure* less enigmatic than in the preceding period (passive).

### **Chapter 5** Can the centre hold? Territory in the Age of Late-Modernity

The current phase of globalization is characterized by attacks on the independent authority of states from different sides: strong non-state entities (individuals, enterprises, NGOs), failed states accommodating forces hostile to the international order, information systems that directly address the citizen (social media), etc. This turns *closure* into an active and disturbing issue, as demonstrated by attacks on multilateral treaties, retro-nationalism or the erection of walls. Doubts about the democratic system also keep *governance* in an active state. These are crude responses to territorial shock that neither eliminate the new fragmentation of space (porosity of boundaries) nor offer a moral imperative for the new global system.

### **Chapter 6** Dying states: prelude to re-territorialization?

The assumption of this chapter is as follows: when states have to start from a clean slate, a more radical accommodation to a new world order is more feasible than a prolonged struggle that involves opposing interest groups and political voices. Here we look at France after the Second World War, Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Somalia after a period of collapse that has lasted more than 25 years. France's incorporation into the European Community was a truly qualitative jump. Russia's transformation under Putin is wrapped up in the guise of classic imperialism. Somalia's destiny is still unclear but shows signs of a glocal or (transnational in Somaliland) incorporation into the world under the influence of an active diaspora. These three cases seem to represent the three choices for the world in a global era.

### **Chapter 7** Globalization and its detractors

Criticism of globalization started with fear of a 'race to the bottom', which would downgrade values like decent working conditions and quality of the environment. A few years later it was the instability of international finance and increasing inequality. In the EU, the institution of a common currency seemed to enhance dependency of certain members. In the Global South the intrusion of enterprises damaging the environment, or the imposition of international norms has incited resistance. None of these is an inevitable consequence of globalization that would necessitate a return to a world of hard spatial containers. On the contrary, international movements may champion local values, and global norms about sustainability may be a local challenge. This is the glocal solution to the perceived danger of globalization.